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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Divorce Decree entered between the parties in 1999, and still in effect today,
clearly orders Appellee Andrew Veysey ("Veysey") to pay one-half of all reasonable
monthly day care expenses incurred on behalf of the parties' minor children. Despite
actual knowledge of this order and of the fact that his children were incurring day care
expenses from 2002 - 2006, Veysey refused to pay what was owed. Appellant Alexis
Nelson ("Nelson") covered the expenses, taking Veysey at his word that he would get
caught up when he could.
Now, in an apparent attempt to detract from his own failure to comply with a court
order, Veysey insinuates that Nelson's persistence in trying to enforce the order shows

frivolity. To the contrary, the present appeal is firmly rooted in Utah law, having been
necessitated first by Veysey's failure to comply with the 1999 court order, and also by
instances of misapplication of Utah law by the lower court. "[I]t is hard to see why a
parent should be relieved of any of the burdens of child-rearing costs by virtue of not
having contributed to them in a timely manner." State of Utah v. Irizarry, 910 P.2d 425,
(Utah 1997)(Durham, C., dissenting)( caselaw not relevant since decided prior to
~

enactment of Utah Child Support Act).

I.

LAW OF THE CASE DOES NOT APPLY.
A. VEYSEY I HELD THAT THERE WERE NO FINDINGS TO SUPPORT

A DETERMINATION THAT LACHES APPLIED IN THIS CASE, AND THAT
THE DISTRICT COURT'S PREVIOUS DETERMINATION THAT LACHES
APPLIED WAS ERRONEOUS.

"Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by this court on appeal bind
vJ

the trial court on remand, and generally bind this court should the case return after
remand." Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 2001 UT 75 at ,r 9, 31 P.3d 543
(Utah 2001). However, "(a]s confessed dicta, [a] musing on the potential outcome of a
hypothetical situation is not binding upon this court." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,r
28, 154 P.3d 808, 815 (Utah 2007).
Here, the Court of Appeals proceedings did not result in a final judgment on the
merits with respect to the issue of laches. Rather, the Court held that the
"commissioner's recommendation contains no findings supporting a determination that
2

laches applies in this case ... Without specific findings supporting a determination that
lac hes applied in this case, the commissioner's recommendation - and, accordingly, the
district court's adoption of that recommendation - was erroneous." Veysey v. Veysey,
2014 UT App 264, ,I 17 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).
The Court further conjectured that "[i]f supported by adequate findings, a
determination that some portion of Mother's claims are barred by }aches would not
necessarily be inappropriate." Id. at ,r 18. This situation, however, was just one of four
different scenarios that the Court hypothesized. Indeed, the Court also opined that "the
district court may conclude that all of Mother's claims are reimbursable because they
were brought within the statute of limitations." Id. In any case, the Court was careful to
note that each of these hypothetical situations was purely speculative, and that "additional
findings [were] needed to support the district court's determination." Id.
This portion of the Court's opinion constitutes an expression that "[goes] beyond
the facts before [the] court and therefore [encompasses] individual views of [the] author
of [the] opinion," which, by definition, is non-binding "obiter dictum." Black's Law
Dictionary, p. 454. This is precisely the type of "musing on the potential outcome of a

hypothetical situation" that the Utah Supreme Court has expressly held does not invoke
the law of the case doctrine. See Jones, 154 P.3d at 815.
The question of whether Utah law precludes }aches as a defense to an action to
enforce a child support order brought within the applicable statute of limitations has
never been presented to nor considered by this Court. Accordingly, the law of the case
3

doctrine does not apply and this Court's consideration of the issue is needed to resolve

..:J

the matter.
B. IF THE COURT IN VEYSEY I HAD HELD THAT LACHES APPLIED,
THAT HOLDING WOULD BE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND WOULD WORK
A MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO NELSON AND HER CHILDREN, THEREBY
PRECLUDING ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE.
The law of the case doctrine "is not applied inflexibly. Indeed, this court need not
apply the doctrine to promote efficiency at the expense of the greater interest in
preventing unjust results or unwise precedent. Accordingly, the doctrine will generally
not be enforced ... when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of
Utah, 2001 UT 75 at ,I 9, 31 P.3d 543 (Utah 2001).
As set forth below, under Utah law, !aches cannot be applied as a defense to court-

""

ordered child support. It was clear error for this Court to suggest otherwise, and would
work a manifest injustice to Nelson if erroneously applied to deprive her of thousands of
dollars expended to cover the portion of daycare expenses that Veysey had been courtordered to pay. Moreover, application of laches to the present case would work a
manifest injustice to the children as well as to Nelson. Indeed, "it is hard to see why a
parent should be relieved of any of the burdens of child-rearing costs by virtue of not
having contributed to them in a timely manner. It is simply unrealistic to suggest ... that
the money in question ... is now the custodial parent's money, not the children's. The
4

children's household is their custodial parent's household; her lifestyle is their lifestyle,
and her gains and losses are theirs." State of Utah v. Irizarry, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah
l 997)(Durham, C., dissenting)( caselaw not relevant since decided prior to enactment of
Utah Child Support Act).
Therefore, even if the Court in Veysey I had held that laches applied, the law of the
case doctrine should not be enforced since that holding would have been clearly
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice to Nelson and her children.
II. LACHESIS AN EQUITABLE DEFENSE ONLY APPLICABLE TO CASES

SEEKING EQUITABLE RELIEF.
"[I]t is the practically invariable rule that laches cannot be a defense before the
statutory limitation has expired." Insight Assets v. Farias, 321 P.3d 1021, 1025-26 (Utah
2013)(quoting F.MA. Fin. Corp. v. Build Inc., 404 P.2d 670,672 (1965)). Recently, the
Utah Supreme Court has clarified the circumstances under which the laches defense may
be invoked. Particularly, the "doctrine of laches is an equitable defense which arises in
cases where the plaintiff seeks equitable relief ... However, where the plaintiff's claims
are based in the law, the statute of limitations, not the doctrine of laches, governs the
timing surrounding a plaintiff's filing of a complaint." DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross &

Co., 926 P.2d 835, 845 (Utah 1996)(citing American Tierra v. City of West Jordan, 840
P.2d 757, 763 (Utah 1992)). Based on this analysis, the Court in DO/Theld that "[i]n the
present case, because plaintiffs' claims against C & Lare based in the law, the trial

5

court's supplemental dismissal of these claims on the basis of the equitable doctrine of
"

laches was incorrect." Id.
Veysey correctly notes that that the Court in DOITconsidered the earlier case of

Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). In DOIT, however, the Court carefully
construed Borland's holding as: "A defendant may successfully assert this defense [of
laches] when a plaintiff seeking equity unreasonably delays in bringing an action and this
delay prejudices the defendant." DOIT, Inc., 926 P .2d at 845 (Utah 1996) (citing Borland

v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987)(emphasis added)).
Likewise, the subsequent 2013 Utah Supreme Court decision in Insight Assets
noted a singular exception to the rule that "laches cannot be a defense before the statutory
limitation has expired." Particularly, "the doctrine of laches may apply in equity, whether
or not a statute of limitations also applies[.]" Insight Assets, 321 P.3d at 1025-26. Based
on this analysis, the Insight Assets Court held that "[b]oth the Purchase Money Rule and
\JJ

mortgage foreclosure actions are equitable in nature and therefore subject to the

equitable defense of !aches[.]" Id. (emphasis added).
Here, Veysey' s arguments are wrongheaded because they fail to distinguish
between equitable actions for setting child support or establishing paternity in the first
instance, and legal actions for enforcing child support already established by court order.
This is an important distinction in this case, since the equitable defense of laches is
prohibited as applied to legal actions for enforcing child support already established by
court order. See Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 321 P.3d 1021, 1025 (Utah 2013)("The
6

doctrine of !aches may apply in equity[.]"); see also DOJT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co.,
926 P.2d 835, 845 (Utah 1996)(("The doctrine oflaches is an equitable defense which
arises in cases where the plaintiff seeks equitable relief ... [W]here the plaintiffs claims
are based in the law, the statute of limitations, not the doctrine of laches, governs the
timing surrounding a plaintiffs filing of a complaint."( citing American Tierra v. City of

West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 763 (Utah 1992)).
While initially setting child support or establishing paternity requires a balancing
of the equities (as was the case in the paternity action of Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d
144 (Utah 1987)), enforcing an existing child support order is a purely legal exercise.
Veysey has specifically conceded this point. (R. 992, ,r 5). This premise is also highly
consistent with the decision in Veysey I, where this court recognized that child support is
"the money legally owed by one parent to the other for the expenses incurred for children
of the marriage[,]" and held that "variable daycare expenses constitute child support."

Veysey, 2014 UT App 264 at ,r,r 14-15 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 274 (9 th ed.
2009),· see also Hammond v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199,201 (Wyo. 2000){"Laches does not
apply to child support collection actions because suits for monetary judgments for child
support arrearages are legal rather than equitable.").
Because of the purely legal nature of enforcing existing child support orders,
"[e]ach payment or installment of child ... support under any support order ... is, on and
after the date it is due: (a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment

7

of a district court ... [and] (c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any
jurisdiction[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-112(3)(a).
All of Nelson's claims seek to enforce the existing child support order established
in 1999. Accordingly, Nelson's "claims are based in the law [such that] the statute of
limitations, not the doctrine of laches, governs the timing surrounding [the] filing of a
complaint." DOIT, Inc., 926 P.2d at 845. Nelson's complaint was filed well within the
~

established statute of limitations, which does not expire for another six years. (R. 714 ).
It was thus clear error for this Court to opine that "(i] f supported by adequate findings, a
determination that some portion of Mother's claims are barred by !aches would not
necessarily be inappropriate." Veysey, 2014 UT App 264 at if 18.
To the contrary, under Utah law, laches cannot be applied as a defense to courtordered child support. If this Court were to hold otherwise, it would work a manifest
injustice to Nelson and her children by unfairly depriving them of thousands of dollars
expended to cover that portion of daycare expenses that Veysey was court-ordered to pay.

III.

THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT CODIFIED AS UTAH CODE

ANN.§ 78B-12-214(3) IS NOT APPLICABLE, AND DOES NOT STATUTORILY
AUTHORIZE A LACHES DEFENSE TO COURT-ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT.
In this case, the district court expressly found that "Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-12-214
vP

[is] not dispositive of this case." (R. 966, if 6) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Veysey's
arguments with respect to the same are misplaced.

8

Veysey also incorrectly asserts that the notification requirement codified as Utah
Code Ann.§ 78B-12-214(3) ("Section 214(3)") statutorily authorizes a !aches defense to
court-ordered child support. This is simply not true. Rather, Section 214(3) provides a
very narrow statutory exception to Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-12-214(2)(a) ("Section
214(2)(a)"), which states that "[i]f an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent
shall begin paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof
of the child care expense."
The exception of Section 214(3) hinges exclusively on Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-12214(2)(b) ("Section 2 l 4(2)(b )"), which provides that "[i]n the absence of a court order to
the contrary, a parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide written verification of
the cost and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement
of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other parent." Section 214(3) does not
contemplate a laches defense to a claim for court-ordered child support. Instead, it
provides an extremely narrow opportunity for a court to statutorily deny a parent "the
right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the
expenses if the parent incurring the expenses fails to comply with Subsection 2(b)." Utah
ode Ann.§ 78B-12-214(3).
Importantly, however, Nelson's claims have not been denied under Section
214(3). Indeed, the "Court found [that] Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-12-214 [is] not
dispositive of this case." (R. 966, ,r 6)(emphasis added). The sole reason the district

9

court even mentioned this Section was to support its equitable laches analysis,
specifically "with respect to the reasonableness of [Nelson's] actions." (R. 966, 16).

Veysey goes to great lengths to analogize SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v.
First Quality Baby Prod. LLC, a Federal Circuit patent case, to the present case.

Contrary to Veysey's analysis, however, the SCA Hygiene case is simply not analogous
~

here.
There, the court held that because "Congress codified a }aches defense in 35
U.S.C. § 282(b )(I) that may bar legal remedies ... [the court had] no judicial authority to
question the law's propriety." SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby
Prod. LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015)(en bane).

Here, on the other hand,

Section 214(3) absolutely does not authorize a laches defense, or any other equitable
defense, to court-ordered child support. In fact, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-12-109 ("Section
109") of the Utah Child Support Act specifically prohibits waiver and estoppel, also
equitable defenses, when there is an "order already established by a tribunal." The
existence of this Section 109 thus strongly suggests that the intent of the legislature was
JJ

actually to prohibit application of equitable defenses to court-ordered child support.
Notably, none of the cases from "sister states" in Veysey's string cite of footnote 7
:J

is relevant here, as none originates from our Tenth Circuit, and Veysey has failed to
discuss how Florida, Ohio, Nevada, or New York law is even comparable to Utah law.
See Brief ofAppellee, p. 25, fn. 7.
IO

All of Nelson's claims are thus reimbursable under the Utah Child Support Act,
since Section 214(3) does not apply, and no provision thereof statutorily authorizes
!aches as a defense to court-ordered child support.
IV. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY BOTH
ELEMENTS OF A LACHES DEFENSE.

"[T]he question of laches presents a mixed question of law and fact." Johnson v.
Johnson, 2014 UT 21, ,r 8, 330 P.3d 704 (Utah 2014). "Pure questions oflaw ... are

reviewed for correctness." Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, ,r 6, citing Huish v.
Munro, 2008 Ut. Ct. App. 283, ,r 19, 191 P. 3d 1242 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). "[T]he

determination of whether a party was prejudiced for purposes of the doctrine of laches is
a legal conclusion that we review for correctness." Anderson v. Doms, 984 P.2d 392, 396
(Utah Ct. App. 2003). However, "we will not set aside a trial court's findings of fact
underlying that conclusion [of prejudice] unless they are clearly erroneous." Id.
Here, no finding of fact is in dispute with respect to the laches element of
reasonableness. The findings of fact are only indirectly disputed with respect to the
laches element of prejudice, since several findings conflict with each other based on an
arbitrary cutoff date. Veysey thus misstates the standard of review for this issue. See
Brief ofAppellee, p. 25. In fact, Nelson contends only that the findings of fact do not

support the district court's legal conclusion that both elements of laches were satisfied.
This is purely a legal issue requiring de novo review.

11

Specifically, no finding of fact supports the legal conclusion that Nelson acted
unreasonably in deciding to file her complaint when she did. The district court found that
Nelson "believed the statute of limitations had not yet run." (R. 966, ,r 5). The district
court also found that "all of [Nelson's] claims for reimbursement fall within the
applicable statute of limitations." (R. 966, ,r 2). All remaining findings of fact regarding
the element of reasonableness are irrelevant, since reliance on a statute of limitations is
vjJ

per se reasonable in a case of court-ordered child support, as set forth in Nelson's Brief of
Appellant, p. 19-20. (R. 966, ,r,r 5-12). Nelson thus submits that the district court's

conclusion that Nelson's conduct was unreasonable is incorrect and should be reversed.
Similarly, no finding of fact supports the legal conclusion that Veysey was
prejudiced with respect to expenses incurred prior to April, 2005, but not prejudiced with
respect to expenses incurred after that date. Under Utah law, "[!]aches is not mere delay,
but delay that works a disadvantage to another." Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse
Shopping Center Assoc., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). The only finding of fact

made to support this cutoff date is that "[Veysey] does not strenuously object to those
costs." (R. 966, ,r 16). While this finding of fact is not disputed, it is legally insufficient
to support a cutoff date that is identical to that initially provided by the Commissioner,
which was later determined to be based on an erroneous statute of limitations.
~

Moreover, the findings of fact with respect to the district court's finding of
prejudice are in conflict with each other. Specifically, the findings of fact made to
support the finding of prejudice prior to April, 2005 (R. 966, ,r,r 13-15) do not comport
12

with the finding of fact made to support the finding of no prejudice after April, 2005 (R.
966,

~

18). As argued in detail in Nelson's Brief ofAppellant, the findings of fact

regarding prejudice hinge primarily on whether Nelson's calculations were reasonably
accurate. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 21-24. Since the findings are based on identical
evidence but are nevertheless blatantly disparate in this regard, they are legally
insufficient to support a finding of prejudice, even prior to the April, 2005 cutoff date.
Nelson thus submits that the findings of fact, while largely undisputed, do not
support the legal conclusion that both elements of laches have been satisfied, as required
by Utah law . Accordingly, the district court's decision should be reversed and Nelson
should be awarded judgment on all claims, plus interest.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's decision in
its entirety, and hold that all of Nelson's claims for child care expense arrearages from
2002-2006 are reimbursable, plus interest.

1
SIGNED and DATED this l irt:'1 day of _,,.A--l-i12
"'-"r_u
....,_
/ _ _ _ _ , 2016.

Pro Se
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